# Channel-metadata audit — `LEI !R6U3+`

## Observation

The saved channel listing metadata file
`../channel-archive/000-UC5zyzlmVbPjMh5rA47t0TJA.info.json` contains the
following fields:

```text
channel: Tengri 137
channel_id: UC5zyzlmVbPjMh5rA47t0TJA
uploader_id: @tengri1378
description: LEI !R6U3+
```

The JSON is a `yt-dlp` acquisition record from 27 July 2026.  Its SHA-256 is
`b6407ddc89ddbd27246efa12c04bdb7ec6418bee4d006bc2161acc630cd6e718`.

## What it establishes

It establishes only that the channel listing returned that exact nine-character
description at the time of that saved retrieval.  It is a potentially useful
lead because it belongs to the same channel record as the 2018 video.

## What it does not establish

- It is **not** PGP-signed.
- It has no retained 2018 Wayback capture in this evidence bundle.
- Channel descriptions are editable.  The record therefore does not date the
  string to 2018 or prove that it was written by the PGP-key operator.
- No source says it is a password, a cipher, or the video's "next message."

## Decoding boundary

`LEI !R6U3+` is too short to select a classical cipher or encoding method.
Removing punctuation does not make a valid unambiguous Base64 payload; applying
ROT, keyboard-layout, substitution, or arbitrary text transformations would
produce many mutually incompatible strings with no independent validation.
Those outputs are not reported as a solution.

The valid next test is provenance recovery: find an independently dated channel
snapshot, an uploader statement that selects a transformation, or another Tengri
artifact that repeats the exact string in a fixed context.  Until then this is
an open metadata lead, not a decoded key.